Accepted quantum description is stochastic, yet history is nonstochastic, i.e., not representable by a probability distribution. Therefore ordinary quantum mechanics is unsuited to describe history. This is a limitation of the accepted quantum theory, rather than a failing of mechanics in general. To remove the limitation, it would be desirable to find a form of quantum mechanics that describes the future stochastically and the past nonstochastically. For this purpose it proves sufficient to introduce into quantum mechanics, by means of a (...) perfected formal correspondence, certain analogs of the classical initial-condition constants. Through the restoration of such parameters at the quantum level one accomplishes a natural accommodation of time anisotropy, wave-function reduction, and “event” description by quantum mechanical equations of motion alone, without the need for extra postulates (e.g., a projection postulate). This requires a complete restructuring of quantum measurement theory. (shrink)

The Ehrenfest paradox is reviewed in order to categorize classes of “resolution” that are logically at least semiconsistent. Cantoni's candidate is analyzed with reference to such a taxonomy of resolutions.

In this, the first of a two-part paper, a conceptual purification of physics is advocated, whereby the idea of the field is completely eliminated in favor of particulate dynamical laws. Previous work concerning a specific formulation of such purely mechanical laws is reviewed and is shown to imply the possibility of existence of electrons and positrons within nuclei or “elementary” particles in stable bound states characterized by real mass-energy and imaginary momentum. The second part of the paper will examine the (...) qualitative implications and the sufficiency of such concepts for physical description.Newton, Introduction to thePrincipia. (shrink)

In this second part of our paper abeta structure hypothesis is advanced, according to which all matter and the vacuum are composed solely of electrons. A direct connection is established between beta processes and nuclear forces. Physical implications of the formalism introduced in Part I are examined. Localized violation of the Heisenberg postulate opens extensive descriptive possibilities inaccessible to current field-derived theories. A weakness of the present attempt at “elementary” particle description is its incapacity to predict observed masses or spatial (...) extensions. This results from the particular (one-body) model employed, which posits an infinitely massive point “force center.” Improvements in the formulation of the relativistic many-body problem will be required to correct this shortcoming. In summary, our investigation reaffirms the logical sufficiency (surmised by Newton) of the elements of mechanics for describing the phenomena of nature. (shrink)

In preceding parts of this paper the possibility was examined of accomplishing the entirety of physical description by means of mechanics, without help from field-theoretical ideas. Apart from some easily obtained qualitative agreements with general descriptive features of nuclei and elementary particles, we were balked in this program by an inability to handle in purely mechanical terms the relativistic many-body problem. The present paper is addressed directly to the latter problem. No quantitative calculations are attempted, but three suggestions are made (...) — each of a quite radical nature — concerning the reformulation that will be necessary to restore mechanics to the mainstream of physics. (shrink)

Einstein's second postulate (light-speed constancy) is modified in the following manner:(1) as to motion of light emitters, no modification is made;(2) as to motion of light absorbers, if the absorber moves with velocityv with respect to the observer, that observer will attribute to light the velocity (c+v). It is shown, with reference to the original Einstein train example, that such a modification of the second postulate restores to kinematics a concept of distant simultaneity. Thus is indicated the complicated (acausal) behavior (...) that must be attributed to light in order that the simple behavior earlier attributed (1) to matter (nonoccurrence of the Lorentz contraction) may be consistent with all known facts. A reply is made to Grøn's critique (2) of the earlier paper on metric standards. It is concluded that further experimental data are needed to decide the simple-light-complicated-matter versus complicated-light-simple-matter issue. (shrink)

It is shown how a consistent kinematic resolution of Ehrenfest's paradox may be given in accordance with the special theory of relativity. Some statements by T. E. Phipps, Jr., connected with these matters, are commented upon. Problems connected with the relation between stress and strain are solved by a manifestly covariant formulation of Hooke's law.

In contemporary discussion of the philosophy of religion, or for that matter of any branch of philosophy, the names of Whitehead and Wittgenstein are not often linked. Whitehead's later work is, for the most part, treated as a rather specialized interest, an attractively under-cultivated field for the enterprising thesis-writer perhaps, but well away from the main centres of current philosophical activity. And what he has to say about specifically religious or theological issues 1 becomes simply one ramification of an ingenious (...) but somewhat eccentric system. Nonetheless, there is at least this much justification for considering it in relation to the much more influential and widely discussed views of Wittgenstein. Whitehead has some original things to say about God, Wittgenstein some original reasons for thinking that Whitehead's brand of originality is here radically misplaced. And the possibility or otherwise of such theological originality is an issue of very considerable importance for the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

What is a natural kind? As we shall see, the concept of a natural kind has a long history. Many of the interesting doctrines can be detected in Aristotle, were revived by Locke and Leibniz, and have again become fashionable in recent years. Equally there has been agreement about certain paradigm examples: the kinds oak, stickleback and gold are natural kinds, and the kinds table, nation and banknote are not. Sadly agreement does not extend much further. It is impossible to (...) discover a single consistent doctrine in the literature, and different discussions focus on different doctrines without writers or readers being aware of the fact. In this paper I shall attempt to find a defensible distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. (shrink)

Laland and colleagues have sought to challenge the proximate–ultimate distinction claiming that it imposes a unidirectional model of causation, is limited in its capacity to account for complex biological phenomena, and hinders progress in biology. In this article the core of their argument is critically analyzed. It is claimed that contrary to their claims Laland et al. rely upon the proximate–ultimate distinction to make their points and that their alternative conception of reciprocal causation refers to phenomena that were already accounted (...) for by standard theory. (shrink)

Tarski [5] showed that for any set X, its set w(X) of well-orderable subsets has cardinality strictly greater than that of X, even in the absence of the axiom of choice. We construct a Fraenkel-Mostowski model in which there is an infinite strictly descending sequence under the relation |w (X)| = |Y|. This contrasts with the corresponding situation for power sets, where use of Hartogs' ℵ-function easily establishes that there can be no infinite descending sequence under the relation |P(X)| = (...) |Y|. (shrink)